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THE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER
Among the maxims which one meets frequently in juristic
writings, is delegat potestas non potest delegari. When
A selects B to do a thing, he ordinarily does not intend to
give, nor give authority to B to select C or D to do it. In
Parker v. Commonwealth,' the principle is applied to the
legislature of a State. The electoral people of the State
are the principal. The legislature is the delegate. "Among
the primal axioms of jurisprudence," says Bell, J., "political and municipal, is to be found the principle that an agent,
unless expressly empowered, cannot transfer his delegated
authority to another, more especially when it rests in a
confidence partaking the nature of a 'trust, and requiring
for its due discharge, understanding, knowledge and rectitude. The maxim is delegat potestas non potest delegari.
And what shall be said to be a higher trust, based upon a
broader confidence than the possession of the legislative
function? What task can be imposed on a man as a member of society, requiring a deeper knowledge and a purer
honesty?"
It might be conceded that the people of the State being the principal, the delegation to a fraotion of the people
of the legislative powers, would be a violation of the maxim.
One is astonished however to find the justice declaring that
'16 Pa. 507. In case of the Borough of West Philadelphia, 5 W.
& S., 281, Gibson, C. J., remarks, "Under a well-balanced constitution, the legislature can no more delegate its proper function than
can the judiciary."
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the remission by the delegate, the legislature, of the power
back to the principal, the entire people, is a violation of it.
"It," the duty of legislation, he says, "is a duty which cannot therefore be transferred by the representatives; no,
not even to the people themselves, for they have forbidden it by the solemn expression of their will, that the legislative power shaU be vested in the General Assembly;
much less can it be relinquished to a portion of the people
who cannot even claim to be the exclusive depositories of
that part of the sovereignty retained by the whole community." It is needless to remark on the absurdity of the
suggestion that the remission of his power by an agent to
his principal, with the principal's consent, is a reprehensible and inadmissible act.
That the legislature cannot delegate legislative power
to a man, or group of men, (less than the entire electoral
people) to a judge, or other officer; to the voters of a
township, ward, borough, city, county, seems to be assumed, although we shall see that there are plain exceptions to the principle. Parker v. Commonwealth, affirms
it. Although Locke's Appeal,' dissents from the result
reached in Parker v. Commonwealth, it does so, not because
it holds the delegability of the legislative power, (for it
assumes the indelegability thereof) but because it denies
that the suspension of the authority to license the sale of
liquor in a geographical division of the State, upon the consent of the people of a ward,' of a city or borough is a delegation of legislative power to these people.
PARKER v. COMMONWEALTH
The act of April 7th, 1846, made it "lawful" for the
citizens of the several boroughs and townships of 18 designated counties, among which was Allegheny, and of the
borough and township of Mt. Pleasant, in Wayne county,
and of the borough of Lewisburg, in Union county, to "decide by their votes (at the annual elections) whether or
272 Pa., 491.

sParker v. Commonwealth, 6 Pa., 507; Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa.,
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not the sale of wines and spirituous liquors shall be permitted among them for the ensuing year." The act provided that when the majority of voters voted "against a
sale of liquors," "it shall not be lawful for any person or
persons to sell vinous or spirituous liquors within said
boroughs, wards or townships ;" nor for the court of quarter sessions or the treasurer of the county to grant licenses
for the sale of liquors.
It declared the sale of vinous
and spirituous liquors within such borough, ward or township, during the ensuing year, to be a public nuisance. The
sale of liquor in violation of the act was made indictable,
and punishable with a fine not less than $20 nor greater
than $100. If the voters in any borough, ward or township voted "for a sale of liquors," the already existing laws
were to continue to operate.
After giving a synopsis of the provisions of the act of
1846, Bell, J., observes, "From this summary of its fea,tures, it will be perceived this act of the General Assembly,
whether considered as an enactment of new and substantive provisions, or as a statute of repeal, abrogating existing laws, depends for its validity and binding efficiency
within the several counties named in it, upon the popular vote of designated districts. Without this affirmatively expressed, it is inert. Possessng no innate force, it
remains a dead letter until breathed upon by the people
and called into activity by an exertion of their voice in
their primary assemblies. Until then, it prohibits no act,
creates no offense, points out no mode of trial, fixes no
penalty, and when so bidden into life, its existence as a
rule of action is limited to the brief period of a single year,
unless new energy be again infused through the medium
of the ballot-box.
If a majority within the particular
district should vote negatively upon the question, yearly
to be submitted to the people, the act as a statute has no existence * * * It (the act) operates not proprio vigore, but,
if at all, only by virtue of a mandate expressed subsequently to its enactment, in pursuance of an invitation given
by the legislative bodies. As it left the halls of legisla-
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tion, it was imperfect and unfinished, for it lacked the
qualities of command and prohibition absolutely essential
to every law. * * * * If it (the statute) has that character

at all (i. e. the character of law) it must have been conferred by the fiat of a portion of the people expressed
through their votes. * * * * If so, what is this other than
a delegation of the legislative franchise by an act of the
General Assembly?"
ALLEGED CONTRARY DECISIONS

In opposition to the view that the suspension of the
law, granting to or withholding from the judges the power
to grant licenses for the sale of liquor, upon the votes of
the people, was an unconstitutional delegation of power,
the principle that the legislature made a delegation of
power, when it conferred on municipal corporations authority to enact ordinances (e. g. an ordinance to prevent
the erection of wooden buildings within certain parts of
the city of Philadelphia), was called to the attention of
the court. Bell, J., thinks he parries the difficulty by remarking that it is founded on an "entire misapprehension
of the nature of the right to make ordinances." He suggests that such ordinances are "no more than a species of
contract between the individual members" or between the
city or borough and a stranger who comes voluntarily
within the jurisdiction, upon the principle that his coming
is equivalent to an assent to be bound by the local law of
the place. How, the justice asks, with an air of triumph,
"how, when or where have 'the minority of the people of
Allegheny county, agreed to be governed by the will of a
majority of their fellows, except in the mode pointed out
by the constitution of the state of which they are members? They have agreed they will be subject to the resolutions of "selected bodies of men to whom the community
has delegated the legislative authority," when their decrees assume the character of laws, because endowed with
the principle of action which only those selected bodies can
confer. But there is no assent beyond this." The analogy
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between the legislation in question and that of municipalities, therefore "altogether fails."
The justice is m:taken. It does not "fail." Whether
there shall be a city, or a 'borough or a township, or a county, the legislature determines. Whether, existing, such city,
etc., shall have this or that power to legislate, or ndt, it likewise determines. The power in a city to legislate no more
springs from the consent of residents within the city, than
does 'the power of the legislature of a state to legislate, depend on the consent of each inhabitant thereof. The legislature could forbid 'wooden buildings in a city. It can
authorize councils to decide whether there shall be such
buildings or not. In thus authorizing, it plainly delegates
;to councils a portion of its legislative power.
What then
hinders its making a ward of a city into a quasi-corporation, and giving to it the authority to permit or prohibit, as
it will, this or that act, e. g., ithe building of wooden structures, the selling of intoxicants? Justice Bell's remarks are
in part unintelligible, and in part inept.
It was urged by those who contended that the act of
1846 was unconstitutional, that the Common Schools statute
of June 13th, 1836, P. L. 525, contained a provision that it
should operate only on the consent of the people of the
several school districts, and that its constitutonality had
not for that reason been contested. Justice Bell thinks he
escapes the difficulty by showing that the law simply suspends the contribution of the state to each district, upon the
district's raising a certain tax, to which tax the voters of the
district were to give their consent. The right to impose
this tax emanated from the legislature, but it was conditioned; and the condition was, the consent of the voting
people of the district. The analogy is flagrant between the
act of 1836 and the act of 1846 in this respect and the
denial of it makes difficult the attribution to the justice
of both candor 'and perspicacity.
It was argued before the court that it was competent
for the legislature to make a law ordaining or forbidding
acts if, and only -if, certain facts should come into exis-
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tence. An act of congress of 1810, modifying that of 1809
prohibiting the introduction of British and French goods
into the United States, unless those countries should repeal theilr edicts against the commerce df -the United
States, and the President should proclaim the fact of such
repeal, was urged on the notice of the court. Bell, J,. remarks "It is plain the revival or conitinued suspension of
the act of 1809 was not made to depend on the proclamation but upon independent facts, of which the proclamation was evidence; after which the statute operated proprio vigor." He thinks the distinction important between a statute whose operation is "suspended upon the
occurrence of a particular event" and one which is inoperative "unless otherwise willed by the people." "In the
first case" he observes, "the law remains quiescent until the
happening of the appropriate event stirs it into motion;
in the last, the so-called law was altogether without the
power of motion, of itself, when it left the hands of the
law makers." Apparently, what the justice means is that
when the legislature wills a certain sequence of fact bon
fact a, when fact a is not the volition of the seuqence by another person its will is valid legislation, but, when it wiils
the sequence of b upon a, only if a man, or a group of men,
likewise wills it, it is unconstitutionally delegating the
legislative power to this group of men. "What is this
more or better" asks the justice, "than simply preTeririg the po"ect of a law to be submitted for the
sanction of a distinct and independent tribunal, whose
will is to determine its future existence or continued
nonantity?"
It was suggested by the counsel who upheld the statute
of 1846, that congress delegates the legislative function
to territorial legislatures. The answer which satisfied
Justice Bell was that the right to do this is conferred
by the provision that "Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the 'territory and other property belongin~g to
In -descrying in this provision a
the United States."
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warrant to delegate otherwise undelegable legislative power, the justice displays an admirable ingenuity.
An effort was made by counsel to discover a similarity between the alleiged delegation of the legislative power,
of the act of 1846 ,and the act of April 14th, 1835 which
submitted to the peqple of the state, the decision whether a
convention should be held to frame a new state constitution. The justice observes that that act did not pertain to
the ordinary business of legislation. The act was not essential to the elaboration of a new constitution. "Though
enacted with all the forms of a law, it was not in truth a
law, for it contained nothing binding or obligatory on the
people, who were at liberty to obey or disobey jt, as they
thought proper."
The justice refers to legislation providing for the erection of poor-houses in several counties, upon an assenting
vote of the people thereof. "Whether," he observes, "this
provision can, in principle, be distinguished from that we
have been reviewing it is not necessary to decide, and perhaps may never be. If it be unconstitutional, these acts
may be cited as showing how silently and insidiously a dangerous practice may creep, unnoticed, into the legislatioh
of the state; but surely they cannot be called in to justify
a continuance of the practice."
ABOLITION OF A TOWNSHIP

The 13th section of the act of March 9th, 1847, P. L.,
256 provided that the continuance of Washington township
in Lebanon county, which had been formed from Bethel
township should depend on a vote of the people. If a majority should favor the new township, it was to remain;
if a majority should be against it, the old township of
Bethel was to "remain as if the said new township of
Washington had never been erected out of the same." A
majority of the voters voted against the new township, and
the court of quarter sessions accordingly refused to appoint a constable for the new township. The Supreme
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court refused to compel the appointment by mandamus.'
holding that the act of 1847 was constitutional. Admitting that Parker v. Commonwealth settled that the General
Assembly could not delegate to the people the power to enact laws by vote, affecting the property and the political
and social rights of citizens, Bell, J., held that the erection
or suppression of a township, like the laying out of. a highway, or the erection of a bridge, may be made dependent
on -he consent of people, of courts, e. g., or of voters. "If
the legislature can authorize the courts to decide questions
of this character, they can also authorize the people primarily to do so." "The power of the legislature directly
to repeal that action (of the court in erecting a township)
cannot be questioned, and that which they could do immediately may also be effected by the secondary means of
a popular vote." This decision was rendered a year after
that of Parker v. Commonwealth, and by the same judge.
The attempt made by Bell, J., to distinguish it is
futile. The legislature willed that Washington township
should disappear, if the voters of Bethel and Washington
township willed its disappearance.
REMOVAL OF COUNTY SEAT

The act of March 3d, 1847, P. L., 209, provided for the
removal of the seat of justice of Delaware county from
Chester to another place, if, on the submission of the question to the voters, a majority of them voted in favor of
the removal. Upon such a vote issuing in such a majority,
it was made the duty of the county commissioners to dispose of the public property in Chester and to cause the
erection of a court house, jail and offices at the newly selected site. The election was held and resulted in a majority in favor of the change of site. Doubting the constitutionality of the act of 1847, however, the commission4

Commonwealth v. Judges of Quarter Sessions, 8 Pa., 391. The
distinction attempted to be drawn between this case and that of
Parker v. Commonwealth is said in Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa., 491, to
"rest on no difference."
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ers of the county declined to proceed with the erection of
buildings at the new site. The Supreme Court compelled
them by mandamus.5 Coulter, J., makes no effort to distinguish the case from Parker v. Commonwealth. He cites
the retrocession by Congress to Virginia of the Virginia
portion of -the District of Columbia. The retrocession was
submitted to a vote of the people. If a majority should
be opposed, the act was to be void; if a majority favored,
the act was to be in full force. The writer of the opinion
curtly remarks, "This court is of opinion the case of Parker v. The Commonwealth does not reach or cover the ase
in hand."
ENLARGEMENT OF AREAS OF CITIES, ETC.

The act of April 6th, 1867, P. L. 846, provides for the
annexation to Pittsburgh of certain districts. The people
dwelling in each of these were to vote. If a majority of
the voters in any district were opposed to consolidation,
the district was not to be included in the city. A bill in
equity was filed in the Supreme Court, to have the act declared unconstitutional, and to enjoin against the holding
of an election in pursuance of it. Refusing the injunction,
Thompson, J., says" "It is not unconstitutional to submit
such a question to the people. We do not regard it within the principle which forbids the delegation of legislative
power. This is applicable to the creation of laws which
the law-making power provided by the constitution must
not delegate. So far as questions like the present are concerned, the constitution itself furnishes a precedent in the
division of counties, so do the acts of assembly in regard
to the division or establishment of new townships created
out of the old. * * * The legislature had the undoubted
power to pass an act for consolidation; it may unquestionably enlarge, divide and change the boundaries of municipal corporations, and may do this without referring the
question of choice to a vote of the people. * * * But it did
'Commonwealth v. Painter, 10 Pa, 214.
6Smith v. McCarthy, 56 Pa., 359.
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not do so. And we think no breach of the constitution was
involved in the method adopted."
THE FENCE LAW

The act of 1700 required the owners of "cornfields
and ground kept for enclosures" to keep them well fenced,
depriving them for neglect to do this of damage for trespasses of cattle, etc., of others, The act of June 2:3d,
1885, P. L. 142, in its first section, repealed this act, but
the second section provided that for the purpose of ascertaining the judgment of the electors as to the repeal,
the voters of each county should vote for or against repeal, and if a majority should favor repeal "this act shall
forthwith take effect therein, but the same shall not take
effect in any county of this commonwealth, until it has
been ascertained that the provisions thereof are deemed
expedient and desired therein, by an election as hereinbefore provided." After a vote against repeal, another
vote could not be taken for three years thereafter. This
was a clear case of the suspension of the legislative will,
with respect to the duty of fencing in any county upon the
vote of a majority of the voters of that county. The act
was declared unconstitutional7 because it was local and
special leigislature concerning the affairs of counties but
Paxson, J., the writer of the opinion observed in it, "I
have not considered it necessary to discuss the question
of the delegation of power." He does however say that,
as the legislature cannot directly pass a valid local law regulating the affairs of counties "it cannot accomplish by in
direction, as by classification resting on no necessity nor
reason of public policy, or by calling in the aid of the people at the polls to breathe life into an othefwise dead statute." But, a dead statute is not a law. The remark implies that the law element in the statute was conferred by
the will of the voters.
7Frost v. Cherry, 122 Pa., 417.
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THE SO-CALLED LOCAL OPTION LAWS
Ordinarily, by a "local option law" is meant one which
allows the people of a ward, borough, city, township or
county to decide whether the sale of liquors therein shall be
permitted. Of this class of acts, that which was deal-t
with in Parker v. Commonwealth is a sample. The act was
there held void, as delegating legislative power to the people of a ward. The act of May 3d, 1871, P. L. 522, provided for a vote by the electors of the 22d ward of the city
of Philadelphia, upon the question whether licenses for the
sale of liquors therein should be issued. "Whenever" said
the act, "by the returns of election in the 22d ward of the
city of Philadelphia, it shall appear that there is a majority 9,aiainst license, it shall not be lawful for any license
to issue for the sale of spirituous, vinuous, malt or other
intoxicating liquors in said ward, at any time thereafter,
until, at an election as above provided, a majority of the
voters of said ward shall vote in favor of a license." The
sale of liquor without a license in the ward was made for
the first offense punishable with a fine of $50 and imprisonment for six months and for subsequent offences,
with a fine of $100 and imprisonment for one year. An
election in the ward resulted in a majority against the
granting of licenses. A bill in equity, in the name of the
Commonwealth, was filed in the court of common pleas
against Locke and two others, city commissioners, to restrain them from granting licenses to sell liquors in the 22d
ward. The court granted the injunction, and its act in so
doing was on appeal affirmed by the Supreme Court.
The doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court is that
while the legislature cannot delegate the law making power
to another person or group of persons, there is no such delegation when a statute provides for the doing or not doing of acts, upon the contingency that such or such things
occur; and that the things on the occurrence of which the
doing or not doing of acts may be made contingent, may
be the opinion, wish, or will of some person or group. The
act of 1871 directed the refusal of all licenses by the city
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commissioners, to sell liquor in the 22d ward if a majority
of the electors willed, and expressed their will in a certain way, that licenses should not be granted. The General Assembly willed that, if the people of the ward willed
so, there should be granted no licenses to sell liquor therein. "The law," says Agnew, J., "is simply contingent upon
the determination of the fact whether licenses are needed,
or are desired, in this ward." The power to grant licenses
may be bestowed on judges upon their decision of their
expediency or necessity in any case. If so, why cannot
the decision be left with the people of a locality.
THE REPEAL OF A LOCAL OPTION LAW

The act of April 11th, 1866, P. L. 658, prohibited the
sale of vinous, spirituous, malt or brewed liquors in Potter county. The act of April 28th, 1899, P. L. 68, in its
first section repealed the act of 1866, provided, said repeal shall not go into effect unless a majority of duly
qualified voters of said county shall vote in favor of said repeal, at an election to be held as provided for in section
three of this act." An election was held in 1902, the result of which was that the repeal went into effect if the
act of 1899 was valid. The court of quarter sessions thereupon granted a license.
The Superior Court reversed
the grant of the license, holding the act of 1899 unconstitutional because of delegated legislative power.
The
Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Superior
Court, and affirmed the order of the Quarter Sessions.'
Brown, J., makes a distinction between the "passage of
the act ,and the contingency under which it was to go into effect. Its passage, he says, "with its condition was the
act of the legislature alone. * * * What the legislature did
in the second section of the act was simply to adopt a
popular vote as a means of reaching a result, without
which it declared its act should not go into effect." The
legislature willed that if the people of Potter county so
willed, the prohibition of licensing, established by the act
8

McGonnell's License, 209 Pa., 327.
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of 1886 should cease. A legislative repeal contingent on
the wishes of the electors, is not a repeal by the electors.
THE SUBSTANCE OF A LAW FURNISHED ABEXTRA

Some of the cases considered illustrate the principle
that the suspension of the operation of an act, in the mode
defined therein, upon a fact which is yet to come into existence, or -the existence of which is yet to be ascertained, is
not a delegation of legislative power, even when the fact
is the volition of a person or a body of electors. Precisely
what is to be done or omitted, on the happening of this
fact, may be ascertained by a perusal of the act. When,
however, the act requires a thing to be done which is not
described in it, but which is to be described by a person
or persons, official or not, so that, until such person or
persons furnish the description it is inoperative, and it is
made operative by his 6r their furnishing the description,
a delegation of legislative power is held to occur. An illustration is found in the act of April 16th, 1891, P. L.
22. This act declares that the insurance commissioner
shall prepare and file in his office a printed form of a
policy of fire insurance, tcqgether with such provisions,
agreements or conditions as may be endorsed thereon or
added thereto. This form is to be known as the standard
fire insurance policy of the state. The act requires under
penalty the incorporation of the provisions of the standard
policy into all contracts of fire insurance. Not denying
the power of the legislature to prescribe a standard policy
of fire insurance, to prohibit "technical and unjust conditions intended to open the way to vexatious litigation,
and to defeat -the just expectations of the insured," Williams, J., holds 9 that the -act of 1891 is a void delegation of
legislative power, because, not itself fixing the terms and
conditions of the policy, it deputes the power to fix them to
the insurance commissioner. Possibly had the legislature
itself created, in the act of 1891, the form of a policy, and
enacted that that form should become obligatory, when it
9

0'Neil v. Insurance Co., 166 Pa., 72.
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was approved by the insurance commissioner the act would
have been deemed valid. If the leigislature may constitutionally will certain effects, provided that they are willed
by the majority of voters, it may do so, provided that they
are willed by a judge, or an insurance commissioner. The
court of common pleas having enforced the statute, by
awarding a non-suit for want of compliance by the plaintiff with the requirements of the policy, the Supreme court
holding the statute void, set aside the non-suit and awarded
a procedendo.
PERMISSIBLE DELEGATIONS

OF LEGISLATIVE POWER

From the foundation of the state, municipalities have
been created, having a more or less complete organization
with greater or less powers, such as counties, townships,
boroughs, cities, school districts. Those of the more complex organization are brought into existence in -order
not only that they may do things by their officers but that
they may require or prohibit the doin g of things by their
inhabitants. Their existence and all their powers come from
the state legislature.10 Their powers are largely legislative as well as -administrative and judicial. The very
things upon which they legislate might be legislated upon
by the General Assembly. Their power to legislate derives from that body. There is then a true delegation of
legislative power to these corporations. Referring to taxation,, Mercur, J., observes "Whatever power of taxation
the legislature possesses, it may delegate to a municipal
government, to be legitimately exercised within its corporate limits. 1 An act of April 18th, 1795 authorizing the
city of Philadelphia to regulate buildings in the city, an
ordinance was passed, in pursuance thereof, forbidding the
erection of any wooden mansion-house, shop, etc., within
a described portion of the city. Duquet was indicted in
the Mayor's court for a violation of this ordinance. The
indictment was removed to the Supreme court by certiorari.
'0 Commonwealth v. Moir, 199 Pa., 534; Philadelphia v. Fox, 64
Pa., 169.
"Butler's Appeal, 73 Pa., 448.
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One of the objections to a conviction was that the legislative power to define and punish offenses could not be
delegated. The Supreme court however, gave judgment
for the Commonwealth."
GIVING THE PEOPLE OF A MUNICIPALITY A VOICE

The constitution of the state has not only authorized
but required the submission of proposed municipal legislation upon some subjects to the people of the municipality.
But, independently of contitutional requirement, the legislature, in conferring power of legislation upon cities,
boroughs, etc., may require the co-operation of the electorate with the councils or other governing bodies. An example may be found in Moers v. City of Reading 3 . The
legislature by act of April 5th, 1853, authorized the city
of Readi. g to subscribe for shares of stock in the Lebanon Valley Railroad Company, but required the councils,
before subscribing, to obtain the consent of the voters, to
be expressed at an election. In ordinary affairs, the power
of decision is conferred on the councils, in this it was divided between councils and the people. Neither, without
the other could decide. It was objected by plaintiffs in
a bill asking for an injunction to prohibit the city from
proceeding under the statute, that it was not an exertion
of legislative power by the Assembly, but a mere delegation
of it to the people of Reading. Says Black, C. J., "We
cannot see it in that light. Half the statutes on our books
are in the alternative ,depending on the discretion of some
person or persons to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing
them. But, it cannot be said that the exercise of such a
discretion is the makin g of a law. * * * When individuals
or corporations are merely authorized to do a thing, the doing of it necessarily depends on their own will; and we
can see no reason why the acceptance of a new power, tendered to a public corporation, may not be made to depend
12

Respublica v. Duquet, 2 Y., 495.
1321 Pa., 188.
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on the will of the people when it is expressed by themselves, as well as when it is spoken by the mouths of their officers and agents." If indeed the legislature may create
councils in boroughs and cities, and communicate to them
a portion of its own legislative power, there can be. no
valid objection to the communication of that power to the
whole mass of inhabitants, or of electors, or to both councils and electors acting conjointly.
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER TO THE COURTS

The courts, by virtue of their being courts, and without express authority of the General Assembly, have power
to make rules which are in fact laws, for the regulation of
practice before them, e. g. may require the certificate of
counsel in addition to the affidavit of a party who asks
for a special jury, 4 or may adopt the rule that "engagements of counsel in the lower courts will not be recognized
as a reason for the continuance or postponement of a cause,
except when they are actually engaged in a trial which
has been commenced in a previous week and is unfinished,
and thus make it the duty of an inferior court, to continue
a trial when the counsel of a party is in the Supreme Court,
at the argument of a cause, in which he is counsel.15 But
the Supreme Courthas no inherent power to adopt rules to
be observed by the inferior courts. The 13th section of the
act of June 16th, 1836, P. L. 789, enacted that the rules of
the Supreme Court of the United States, concerning equity
practice shold be observed by the courts of this state "unless it be otherwise provided by act of assembly, or the
same shall be altered by the Supreme court of this commonwealth, by general rules and regulations made and published as is hereinbefore provided." The Supreme Court
has adopted equity rules and this adoption has been, says
Brown, J., "by the authority of an act of the legislature."
Hence he further says, they "have all the force and effect of a positive enactment" and all proceedings not in
14 Dubois v. Turner, 4 Y., 361.
15 Peterson v. Atlantic City R. R. Co., 177 Pa., 335; Smith v.
Times Publishing Co., 178 Pa., 481.
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What the
conformity with them are irregular and void.'
leigislature might have done directly, it has authorized the
Supreme Court to do. There is thus a delegation of legisHoweveraverse to such delegations, the
lative power.
court may be, in general, it has no objection to this particular delegation to itself. It is the part of a good judge to
expand his jurisdiction, and such a judge is loath to reject
a gift of jurisdiction even though it be in nature legislative.
16Yetter v. Delaware Valley R. R. Co., 206 Pa., 485; Traction
Co. v. Phila., etc., R. R. Co., 180 Pa., 432; Palethorp v. Palethorp,
184 Pa., 585.
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MOOT COURT
ILLINGS v. WORTH
Contracts-Offer and Acceptance-Mistake
in Communicating Offer

of Telegraph Company

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Worth sent a telegram to Illings offering him potatoes at fiftyfive cents, but the telegraph operator mistakingly made the message read thirty-five cents. Illings at once accepted the offer, as
he had received it. Worth not yet knowing of the mistake shipped
the potatoes but arrested them on the way, on learning that Illings
had believed them offered at thirty-five cents. This is an action
for damages for breach of contract by Worth.
Smith fbr plaintiff.
Bashore for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
GUNTER, J. Plaintiff in this action seeks to recover for breach
of contract. He must, of course, show that one existed between
himself and the defendant. One of the prerequisites to a valid and
binding contract is that there must be mutuality of assent, which
naturally resolves itself into offer and acceptance. Hence there
could be no doubt but that there would be no contract if defendant
had met the plaintiff in person and had said "My price is fifty-five
cents" and the latter had answered, "I will buy for thirty-five
cents." This would be a disagreement instead of an agreement.
Is this mutuality of assent supplied by the fact that the defendant employed the telegraph company to transmit the message for
him?
Some courts hold that such employment of the telegraph
company makes the company the agent of the sender and he is therefore bound by its acts. But it is rather difficult to see upon what
theory or principle such an agency arises. The telegraph company
can not be said to be a private agent. It is similar to railroad companies, in that it is given certain privileges by the Commonwealth,
such as the power of eminent domain, and in return for these privileges certain duties and obligations are placed upon it, such as the
duty to accept and transmit all messages offered to it. Neither the
plaintiff nor the defendant has any power to supervise the manner
or means which the company uses in the discharge of its duties to the
public in the transmission of messages for particular individuals.
The paper on which the sender writes his message is never delivered
to the sendee, but the company sends the message which is written
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thereon over the wire and it is reduced to writing at the other end.
Knowing the scope of the employment and the methods of transmission, the sendee should be held to know that the sender is bound
by the contents only so far as it is a faithful reproduction of what
it sent. The company retaining exclusive control of the manner of
performance and of its own employees and instrumentalities the sender of the message being absolutely without voice in the matter, it
seems that the position of the company is that of an independent contractor, as defined and understood in those cases where the employer
is held to be not responsible for negligence of contractor in the performance of his work. Pepper v. Telegraph Co., 87 Tennessee 554; 4
L. R. A., 661.
The case of N. Y. & Washington Printing Telegraph Co. v. Dryburg, 35 Penna., 298, is held out by some as authority for the proposition that the telegraph company is the agent of the sender, 35
Cyc., 63 and 9 Cyc. 294. But as was said in Pepper v. Telegraph
Company, supra, what is said in that case as to agency of company
so as to bind sender is pure DICTUM. A glance at the parties will
indicate that it is the telegraph company and not the sender that
is being sued. The Dryburg case is first reported in 3 Phila., 408,
where Judge Sharswood says "The telegraph company can not be
considered the sender's agent in a proper sense.
To constitute it
such, the sender ought to have some control over the transmission of
his message. He should at least have had a right to be present to oversee that his business was properly done, so as not to subject him to
responsibility to strangers, if not the right to take it in hand and do
it himself. A man employed to make a coat for another can not
subject his employer to an action by a third person for the consequence of his negligence. One who contracts to build a house is in
no sense his servant. This is the position of the telegraph company.
It contracts with the sender to deliver his message to the sendee.
The company and the sender are both principals as to the sendee. If
he is injured by the negligence of either of them his recourse is to
the party guilty of the negligence and to him ONLY. These responsibilities are independent of contract and rest on no privity between the parties and are therefore incurred to strangers."
This case was appealed in 39 Penna., 303, where the Court said
that the telegraph company was not only the agent of the sender
but also the agent of the sendee, because telegraph companies are
public institutions and are open to all and that it shall FOR ALL
PURPOSES OF LIABILITY BE CONSIDERED AS MUCH THE
AGENT OF HIM WHO RECEIVES AS OF HIM WHO SENDS
THE MESSAGE. This seems to indicate that the theory of agency
is used only for the purpose of FASTENING LIABILITY on the
TELEGRAPH COMPANY.
In the case at bar the sendee could successfully maintain a
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suit against the telegraph company without being met with the
doctrine of respondeat superior, because the wrong done by the
company was one of MISFEASANCE and not NONFEASAN1CE.
As to the question of agency, it was said in Wolf Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Company, 24 Pa. Sup., 135, "Whilst it may be
true, THAT IN A SENSE the company was the agent of the sender
it was such for the purpose of submitting a telegram estimating
the cost of certain articles at $1735. The sender was not bound
by a telegram offering the same articles for $735 as delivered to
the sendee, and in refusing to be bound by telegram as delivered to
the plaintiff, the sender did not render himself liable for the difference between the estimate delivered to the defendant and that
which was transmitted and delivered to plaintiff by it.
In Bailey and Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 227 Pa., 522,
it was said that for its negligence in transmitting the very message prescribed, it is responsible in an action sounding in tort to
the part to whom the erroneous message is addressed, and even if
the company be considered the agent of the sender of the message
it is liable to third persons as a wrongdoer for any misfeasance in
the execution of the duties confided to it.
From the above Pennsylvania cases it will be seen that the
theory of agency is used in a very limited manner for the purpose
of establishing the liability of the company.
The leading case supporting the plaintiff's contention is Ayer
v. Western Union Tel. Co., 79 Maine, 493; 10 Atl. 495. It will be noticed
that this was an action by the SENDER against the company and
not by the SENDEE AGAINST the SENDER and also that the
contract in that case had been performed. The case also admits that
the sender should have his remedy over against the company. It
seems much more feasible to do what was suggested in the Dryburg
case, that is allow the injured party to sue the one who caused the
injury, and thus prevent a number of costly suits. If two suits are
to be allowed the evidence in the first suit might satisfy one jury
that a breach had occurred, and hence the sendee would recover,
but this evidence placed before another jury might cause them to
reach an entirely different result, and hence the sender would be
unable to recover against the company. Public policy therefore demands that the wrong be redressed in one action and that it be
brought against the one who committed the wrong. It is also said
in the Ayer case, supra, that the rule laid down presupposes the
innocence of the sendee, and that there is nothing to cause him to
suspect an error. If there be anything in the message or the attendant curcumstances, or in th prior dealings of the parties, or in
any thing else, indicating a probable error in the transmission, good
faith on the part of the sendee may require him to investigate before acting. From the contents of the telegram in the case at bar,
one would suppose that the sendee must have been a wholesaler and
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as such it is fair to assume that he was familiar with the market
price of potatoes, and that the discrepancy of twelve cents a bushel
would be enough to put him on inquiry as to the correctness of the
message. Potatoes generally sell for fifty-five or sixty cents and
in view of the fact that the original offer was for fifty-five cents,
it is possible to take the case out of the Maine rule even if we should
consent to adopt the same.
However, we prefer to follow the other rule that the company,
if an agent at all, is only one in a limited sense, just as the United
States post office is regarded as the agent of the sender of the letter. The idea that the government postal service is an agent is now
regarded as a mistaken notion. Ashley on Contracts, Page 35.
Ayer v. The Telegraph Company is criticised in Ashley on Contracts where it is said, "The court allowed this claim apparently on
the theory that there was a contract to furnish the goods at the
lower price. This is clearly wrong, and cannot be sustained on any
theory. Even if it were true that the telegraph company is in any
sense an agent it certainly has NO AUTHORITY to do anything
but deliver the MESSAGE SENT. The offer contemplated was
never made and the company had no authority express or implied
to make any other. Hence as there was no offer, there could be no acceptance, and no contract." The author then lays down the rule
that when a person sends a telegram he contracts with the telegraph
company to forward his message. The company is not in any true
sense his agent. Should the company negligently deliver a wrong
message, thereby causing injury to the recipient, such recipient has no
ground of action on contract, either against the company or the person sending the message. He should be allowed an action in tort
against the company.
It follows that the plaintiff has sued the wrong party and has
brought the wrong form of action and judgment is accordingly
given for the defendant.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
By mistake of the intemediary, the potatoes were offered to
Illings for 35 cents. Worth intended to offer them, and instructed
the intermediary to offer them for 55 cents. It is evident that the
parties did not agree to the same thing, and this want of agreement,
prevents, we think, the formation of a contract.
Should Worth be precluded from showing that his offer was of
potatoes at 55 cents? We think not. He employed as the learned
court below has well shown, the telegraph company, an independent
contractor, and he is not to be made responsible for its error in the
transmission of the telegram. He is not shown to have been guilty
of any negligence. Nor is it shown that, by denial to Illings of the
right to compel the sale at 35 cents, any legal injury is done him.
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He has no moral right to make profit out of the mistake of the telegraph company at the expense of Worth. Why should he have a
legal right?
We cannot do better than adopt the conclusion reached in a
somewhat similar case by the court of Indiana. In Mummenhoff v.
Randall, 49 N. E., 40, A directed the stenographer to write a letter
offering to B, potatoes at 55 cents. She mistakenly wrote 35 cents,
and the letter, with this mistake, was sent to B. B in ignorance of
the mistake, accepted the offer. A learned of the mistake, informed
B, who insisted on keeping the potatoes. The court held that no
contract was formed, until B, learning of the mistake, and that A
was intending to sell the potatoes at 55 cents, nevertheless retained
them. He thus made a contract to pay 55 cents. The type-writer
was the agent of A, but that gave no right to B to maintain that a
contract was made by his aceptance on A's part to sell and on his
part to buy the potatoes at 35 cents. The judgment is affirmed.
DUNCAN v. BROWN
Liability of Indorser on a Promissory Note After Dishonor Discharged by Failure of Payee to Give Immediate Notice and Demand
Payment-Right of Indorser to Recover Back Money Paid on
Note When Under No Legal Obligation to Pay
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Brown held a note for $300.00 payable on May 11, 1914, on which
Duncan was indorser. On June 11, Brown informed Duncan of the
note, stating that it was due on that day. Duncan forgetting the
true date, paid the note. On obtaining it he perceived that he had
been discharged as indorser because of failure to demand payment
on May 11th, and to give him immediate notice.
This is a suit to recover the money.
Morosini, for plaintiff.
Potter for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
MARTIN, J. The liability of an indorser of a promisory
note is only secondary. It depends on due presentation to the maker,
demand of payment at the proper time and place, and notice of dishonor. These are necessary conditions or ingredients of an indorser's absolute liability, unless waived by him: Chestnut Street
National Bank v. Ellis, 161 Pa., 241, 1894; Peale v. Addicks, 174 Pa.,
543, 1896; and Wolf v. Jacobs, 187 Pa., 360, 1898. The Act of May
16, 1901, P. L. 194, Sec. 89; also Purdon's Dig. (13th Ed.), 3290, provides that "except as herein otherwise provided, when a negotiable instrument has been dishonored by non-acceptance or non-pay-
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ment, notice of dishonor must be given to the drawer and to each indorser and any drawer or indorser to whom such notice is not given
is discharged." The came act further provides, in Sec. 102, that
"Notice may be given as soon as the instrument is dishonored, and
unless delay is excused, as hereinafter provided, must be given within the times fixed by this Act." There is no provision in this act
which can be interpreted to indicate an intention to permit the holder of a note to wait one month after its maturity to notify an indorser in contemplation of a recovery against him upon his liability
as a surety. It was held in the case of Solomon v Cohen, 94 N. Y.
Suppl., 502, 1905, that notice to an indorser that a note has not been
paid, given two or three days after it was due, is too late. In the
case of Slack v. Longshaw, 8 Ken. L. Rep. 166, 1886, it was decided,
that since immediate presentment and notice are necessary to fix
the liability of an indorser of a bill payable on demand, where there
has been delay, he need not show as a matter of fact that he was injured thereby. Furthermore, the statute of limitations is applied
with the same effect in a court of equity as in a court of law, and
a party who has been guilty of lashes has no standing in either.
Hamilton v. Hamilton, 18 Pa., 20; Neely's Appeal, 85 Pa., 387, 1877.
Therefore it is clear that the law would not have compelled
payment in an action by Brown against Duncan brought one month
after maturity, the defendant not having been notified upon the the dishonor of the note at maturity.
The point remains whether or not the plaintiff can recover back
money paid by mistake which the law would not have compelled him
to pay?
The principle that "Every man must be taken to be cognizant of
the law," was first established by Lord Ellenborough in the case of
Bilbie v. Lumley, 1802, 2 East 469, 470, 472; Woodward on "The Law
of Quasi Contracts", page 54, Sec. 35. This case established the rule
that money paid by mistake of law, even under circumstances which
make it inequitable for the defendant to retain it, is not recoverable.
The courts of law, while frequently evincing the most profound dissatisfaction with the rule, have followed it with unusual consistency,
and even the courts of equity though granting relief from mistakes
of law in other cases, have refused to permit the recovery of money
paid: Hemphill v. Moody, 64 Ala., 468, 1879; Tiffany Co. v. Johnson
& Robinson, 5 Cush. (27 Miss.), 227, 232, 1854; Knickerbocker Trust
Co. v. Oneonta, etc. R. Co., 123 N. Y. Supp., 822, 1910.
The general rule is well settled that one who voluntarily pays
money with full knowledge or means of knowledge of all the facts,
without any fraud having been practiced upon him, cannot recover
it -back by reason of the payment having been made in ignorance of
law: Bobst v. Gring, 32 Pa., Super., 541, 1906; Natcher v. Natcher,
47 Pa., 496; Real Estate Saving Institution v. Linder, 73 Pa., 371;
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Finnel v. Brew, 81 Pa., 362; Gould v. McFall, 118 Pa., 455; Schoenfeld v. Bradford, 16 Pa. Super., 165.
Where money is voluntarily paid to one entitled to receive, it
cannot be recovered back on the ground that payment was made under
a mistake of law: Peters v. Florence, 38 Pa., 194; Irvine v. Hanlin,
10 S.& R., 219; Real Estate Savings Inst. Co. v. Tinder, 74 Pa., 371;
Walter v. Robb, 1 Ash., 43; Westfield v. Dill, 12 Pa., C. C. 30.
Where one's misreliance upon a supposed duty is the result of two
mistakes; one of fact and one of law, he is not entitled to relief in
jurisdictions where money paid under mistake of law cannot be recovered; Needles v. Burk, 81 Mo., 569, 1884; 51 Am. Rep. 251; Woodward
on "The Law of Quasi Contracts," page 71, Sec. 44.
It cannot be said that a fraud was perpetrated upon the plaintiff.
He had every means of ascertaining the truth of the defendant's statement that the note was due on that day. In paying the note he only
did that which in equity and conscience he should have done, but which
the law would not have compelled him to do. He has in effect waived
his right to notice under the law and has assumed his original liability.
The plaintiff is no worse off that he would have been if he had received notice as indorser on the day of dishonor, for he still has his rem,
edy against the maker of the note.
The plaintiff claims to recover on the ground of a misreliance upon a mistake of both fact and law. In view of the authorities cited as
applied to the circumstances of this case the court is of the opinion
that the plaintiff cannot recover. Judgment for defendant.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
When the plaintiff paid the defendant the amount of the note, he
was ignorant of the facts (to wit, failure to present and demand) which
operated under the law to discharge him from liability. He is therefore entitled to recover the amount which he paid. "Where the indorser of a note pays the same without negligence and without knowledge of the fact that he has been discharged such payment may be recovered by him." 7 Cyc., 1044.
The fact that the plaintiff could probably have discovered the
facts if he had examined the note does not disentitle him to recover.
"Money paid in ignorance of the facts is recoverable notwithstanding
laches; laches, in the sense of a mere omission to take advantage of
the means of knowledge within the reach of the party paying the
money, is not sufficient to disentitle him to recover it back." Girard
Trust Co. v. Harrington, 23 Super., 615. Furthermore, the plaintiff
relied upon the statement of the defendant. This makes his right
to recover more clear. Dotterer v. Scott, 29 Super., 553. Judgment
reversed.
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KILPATRICK v. REPPERT
Trespass-Action to Recover Damages for Death of Dog by Automobile-City Ordinance Limiting Rate of Speed
OPINION OF THE COURT
Brown for plaintiff.
Bender for defendant.
BURNS, J. This is an action of trespass to recover damages for the death of plaintiff's dog, alleged to have been sustained by the negligent operation of an automobile owned and operated by defendant, Reppert. The facts show that at the time of the
accident, defendant was riding in the automobile alone, in the limits
of the borough, and was going at the rate of forty miles an hour when
he struck plaintiff's dog, valued at $50. The maximum speed permitted by the borough ordinance was ten miles per hour and the dog, when
struck, was endeavoring to escape from the middle of the street to the
sidewalk.
The only evidence in this case to show negligence would be the
neglect to stop the automobile when the dog was endeavoring to
cross. If Reppert had seen the dog and could have stopped, there
would have been negligence. If he knew the dog was there in danger of being struck, it was his duty to stop. If the manner in which
the machine was run on the occasion of this accident was such that
it was grossly negligent; that is, careless to such a degree that a reasonable man would say it was reckless, then there is an obligation to
pay damages independent of the matter of due care. In any event the
question of negligence is for the jury.
In Furness v. The Railroad Co., 4 D. R., 784, an action for damages was brought against defendants for the killing of a dog valued
at $500.
It appeared from the evidence in this case that the railroad
operated a trolley line over the public road near plaintiff's residence.
The plaintiff's dog ran upon the track in front of the car, which was
going at a high rate of speed, and was seen by the motorman about
fifty yards away but not on the track, and it was held that there was
no evidence of guilty negligence in the killing of the dog. The court
went on to say that dogs, like other domestic animals, are to a certain
extent under the protection of the law, but a dog's place is at his
home, and if he strays on the highway he then has not the same right
as if in the enclosure of his master, whose control he is under, especially in the case of a valuable dog, such as this was.
The court was also of the opinion that the same kind of care is
not required to save the life of a dog that would be to save the life
of a human being.
It is well settled at common law that dogs are property so far as
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to enable an owner to maintain an action for damages against one who
wrongfully kills or injures his dog. Wheatley v. Harris, 70 Amer.,
Dec. 258; Heisrodt v. Hackett, 34 Mich., 283.
But the American courts hold dogs to be entitled to less legal
regard and protection then more harmless, useful domestic animals.
Blair v. Forehand, 100 Mass., 141; Jenkins v. Ballantpne, 16 L. R. A.,
689
The opinion in Jones v. Bond, 40 Fed. Rep., 281, states that employees in charge of a train are not bound to exercise the same care
to avoid injury to an intelligent dog, upon the track, as in the case of
other animals, the presumption being that a dog has the instinct and
ability to get out of the way of danger, and will do so unless its freedom of action is interfered with by other circumstances.
A conductor is not guilty of negligence rendering the company
liable for killing a dog, in signalling the engineer to start without
paying any attention to a dog which he saw go under the train after
it had stopped to unload freight. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Scott, 17 S. W-:
1116. And Jameson v. Southwestern R. Co., denies recovery for an
unintentional though negligent killing, holding that dogs are property
only in a qualified sense.
In Liedermann et ux'v. R. R., 165 Pa., 118 it was held that evidence that a city ordinance forbade trains to be run at a higher rate
of speed than five miles an hour may be considered in ascertaining
whether or not the train was being negligently run, but such an ordinance is not in itself evidence of negligence. From the foregoing
conclusions of law, verdict must be for defendant.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
The judgment of the learned court below is affirmed because the
facts stated in the present case are not sufficient upon which to base
a finding that negligence on the part of the defendant was the proximate cause of the injury to the dog.
The facts state (1) that the plaintiff ran over and killed the dog;
(2) while driving at a high rate of speed; (3) when the dog was endeavoring to escape from the middle of the street to the sidewalk.
We are not informed as to the other details of the accident which in
view of the known habits and characteristics of dogs might have been
very significant. "It would be easy to surmise a variety of things entering as acts of causation into the injury of the dog which might have
occurred in addition to the factors stated and consistent with them."
The improper speed of the automobile might have concurred in point
of time with the injury to the dog without being, in a legal sense, the
cause of it. The learned court below was right in not permitting the
jury to conjecture "what the real proximate eause of the killing of the
dog was." See Wallace v. Waterhouse, 86 Conn., 546. Judgment affirmed.
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ALEXANDER v. SIMMONS
Rights of a Bona Fide Holder Without Notice of a Note Given For
Money Lost in Betting-Construction of Section 55, 57, and 197
of Negotiable Instruments Act-Their Effect on Section 8 of Act
of April 22, 1794
STATEIENT OF FACTS
Simmons, having lost in betting, gave to the winner a note, negotiable in form, for the amount lost. The winner endorsed the note
before its maturity to Alexander, an innocent purchaser for value.
The court was requested to instruct the jury that under the Negotiable
Instrument Act, the illegality of the note did not prevent a recovery.
The court told the jury that there could be no recovery. Alexander appeals.
Garrahan for plaintiff.
Rockmaker for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
PRINCE, J. The question to be determined in this case is whether
under the Negotiable Instruemnt Act of 1901, May 16th, a bona fide
holder without notice, of a note given for a gaming consideration can
recover on the note against the maker of the note. It is admitted by
the learned counsel for the plaintiff that there could have been no
recovery prior to the Negotiable Instrument Act of May 16th, 1901,
under the Act of April 22nd, 1794, section 8, Smith's Laws 117, but
he contends that the Act of 1901 has repealed the Act of 1794 in so far
as section 8 is involved.
Section 8 of the Act of April 22, 1794, 3 Smith's Laws 177, provides
that persons losing money at any game of address or hazard, play or
game whatsoever, "shall not be compelled to pay or make good the
same; and every contract, note, bill, bond, judgment or mortgage, or
other security or conveyance whatsoever, given, granted, drawn or entered into, for the security or satisfaction of the same, or any part
thereof, shall be utterly void and of none effect." This Act is analagous to the Statute of Anne, Ch., 14, section 1, which makes notes
given for money lost at play utterly void, frustrate and of none effect,
to all intents and purposes whatsoever. The purpose of these Acts
was to indirectly prevent gambling or gaming. While it is true that
gaming is a criminal offense, nevertheless, the legislative bodies found
it advisable to pass the act, in order to make it absolutely impossible for one gaming or his subsequent transferee or transferees to recover where there was a gaming consideration. They realized that it
was very easy for the gaming parties to give a note, bond, judgment,
etc., for the money lost, and that the winner would transfer the note
or security thus given to an innocent purchaser for value without notice and thereby eliminate the doctrine of "Personal Defences." There-
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fore to avoid this result, they passed the Act of April 22, 1794, 3
Smith's Laws, 117, which made the gaming transaction a "Real Defence," enforceable even as against a bona fide purchaser for value
before maturity and without notice.
Counsel for the plaintiff contends that section 55 and 57 are in
direct conflict with section 8 of the Act of 1794 and, therefore, section
197, which provides that "All acts and parts of acts inconsistent. with
this act are hereby repealed," repeals sectoin 8 of the Act of 1794.
Section 55 of the Negotiable Instruments Act of 1901 provides that,
"The title of a person who negotiates an instrument is defective within the meaning of this act when he obtained the instrument, or any
signature thereto, by fraud, duress, or force and fear, br other unlawful means, or for an illegal consideration, or when he negotiates it in
breach of faith, or under such circumstances as amount to a fraud."
Section 57 provides that "A holder in due course holds the instrument
free from any defect of title of prior parties, and free from any defenses available to prior parties among themselves, and may enforce
payment of the instruments for the full amount thereof against all
parties liable thereon."
Prior to the passage of the Act of 1901, Pennsylvania by a line of
decisions has held that under the Act of 1794, a negotiable note given
for a gaming consideration is void in the hands of even an innocent
purchaser or holder for value. Unger v. Boas, 13 Pa., 601, 1850; Harper v. Young, 112 Pa., 419, 1886;Fareira v. Gabell, 89 Pa., 89; Cauler v.
Hartley, 178 Pa., 23; Griffith v. Sears, 112 Pa., 523; Northern National
Bank v. Arnold, 187 Pa., 356, 1898; Merchants' Bank v. Harrison, Vol.
18, Dickinson Law Review, page 1357
In the case of Merchants' National Bank v. Harrison (Supra.),
the learned Superior Court expressed a dictum on page 137, "The action is not by Dr. Stoop, but by the Merchants' Bank. Had the note,
which is negotiable, been discounted by the bank in ignorance of the
consideration of it, the bank could have compelled payment." However, it is merely dictum and no cases are cited to support the view.
We are therefore free to decide the case contra to the view expressed
in that learned opinion of the Superior Court in Merchants' Bank v.
Harrison (supra.). Wirt v. Stubblefield, 17 App. D. C., 283, held that
since the passage of the Negotiable Instruments Act, there could be a
recovery, the Court saying, "We know, moreover, that the great and
leading object of the Act, not only with Congress, but with the larger
number of the principal states of the Union that have adopted it, has
been to establish a uniform system of law to govern negotiable Instruments wherever they might circulate or be negotiated. It was not
only uniformity of rules and principles that was designed, but to embody in a codified form, as fully as possible, all the law upon the subject, to avoid conflict of decisions, and the effect of mere local laws
upon the subject and usages that have hitherto prevailed. The great
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object sought to be accomplished by the enactment of the statute is to
free the Negotiable Instruments Act as far as possible from all local
infirmities that would otherwise inhere in it to the prejudice and disappointment of innocent holders as against all the parties to the instrument professedly bound thereby. This clearly would not be effected so long as the instrument was rendered absolutely null and void
by local statute." See also Schlesinger v. Kelly, 117 App. Div., 541,
1906. 97 S. W. 353, however, is decided directly contra to Schlesinger
v. Kelly (supra), and therefore, there is a decided conflict betweer
courts upon the question in issue.
In Pennsylvania, the only case on the question is Martin v. Hess,
23 District Reports 195, Jan., 1914, and in that case on the very facts
of the case at bar, it was held by Judge Wheeler, Municipal Court of
Philadelphia, that section 57 of the Negotiable Instruments Act of
1901, P. L. 194, providing that a holder in due course holds the instrument free from any defect of title of prior parties and free from any
defenses available to prior parties among themselves, does not repeal
section 8, Act of April 22, 1794, 3 Smith's Laws 171, making a note
given for a gaming consideration void. This decision is directly opposed to the result reached in Wirt v. Stubblefield (supra), but we
think that the reasons in support of the doctrine of Martin v. Hess
(supra) are far more logical and conclusive than those enunciated to
support Wirt v. Stubblefield (supra). Can we presume that it was
the intention of the framers of the Negotiable Instruments Act a~ld of
the Legislatures that passed the Act, to allow gambling, even, though
the allowance is indirect? Which reason carries more weight, the one
in support of Wirt v. Stubblefield (supra), that a recovery should be
allowed in order that there a more perfect system of negotiability
in all cases, or the one laid down in Martin v. Hess (supra) that the
act is not to apply in cases of "Real Defense," as where the consideration is illegal and made so by statute? Section 55 of the Negntiable Instruments Act provides that "The title of a person who negotiates an instrument is defective." The very use of the word "defective" raises a presumption that the framers intend that the section
should only apply to "Personal Defenses." The presumption is based
on antiquas decisis, "that a note given for gaming consideration is
void and of no effect, and therefore, the party has no title whatsoever,
and cannot be considered to have a defective title within the meaning
of Negotiable Instrument Act of 1901. Our opinion is that the section applies to cases where there is a negotiable note and there is
some defect, and not to cases where there is an alleged negotiable
note. The Act of 1794 says that the note shall be void, therefore, it
is not a negotiable note. The mere fact that it is drawn up in negotiable form does not make it negotiable. The Act of 1901 was made
applicable only to negotiable notes. To hold that the Act of 1901 is
applicable to a note that is alleged to be negotiable would be to say
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that altho in section 1, of the Act of 1901, it provides that, "An instrument,to be inegotiable must conform to the following requirements:--"
if those requirements are not complied with, nevertheless sections
55 and 57 do apply and the decision should be based upon sections 55
and 57. The effect of the Act of 1794 is that the alleged note is merely a paper and not a note, therefore, the party has no title whatsoever; the Act of 1901 says that the title is defective if given for an
illegal consideration. We feel that that cannot be construed to include
cases in which an Act says that the note thus given upon that illegal consideration is void. Furthermore, in analyzing setcion 57 of
the Act, which provides, "and may enforce payment of the instrument for the full amount thereof against all parties LIABLE thereon," the use of the word "liable" clearly indicates that the framers
recognize that there are cases in which the parties may not be liable,
for example as in the case at bar. If they intend the broad doctrine
that there could be a recovery in all cases, the words 'liable thereon"
are mere surplusage.
As to section 197, which provides that "All acts and parts of acts
inconsistent with this act are hereby :epealed," we do not favor repeal
by implication. In Jackson v. P. R. R. Co. 228 Pa., 566, it was decided that, "Repeals by implication are not favored, and will not be indulged unless it is manifest that the legislature so intended. It is
well settled that the learning of all the Courts is strongly against repealing the positive provision of a former statute by construction.
There must be such a manifest and total repugnance that the two
enactments cannot stand. It is not enough that there is a discrepancy between different parts of a system of legislation on the same
general subject; there must be a conflict between the different acts
on the same specific subject. An early statute is repealed only in
those particulars wherein it is clearly inconsistent and irreconcilable
with the later enactment."
Upon the above reasoning and in reliance on the case of Martin
v. Hess (supra), the charge of the lower court was correct and, therefore, plaintiff's appeal is dismissed. Judgment affirmed.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
The learned court below has followed Wheeler, J., of the Municipal Court of Philadelphia, in Martin v. Hess, in holding that the
Act of 1794 is not repeated by the Act of 1901. A learned note in
the 27th Harvard Law Review, p. 679, gives reasons for approving
this decision. We cannot do better than to adopt it. The judgment is
therefore affirmed.

